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RULE 11 SANCTIONS REVISITED: 
TOWNSEND V. HOLMAN 
CONSULTING CORPORATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.l the Ninth Circuit 
held that a frivolous motion, even though contained within the 
same document as a non-frivolous motion, would nonetheless 
be subject to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11 {"Rule 11").2 
1. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991) (per 
Fletcher, J., with whom joined Goodwin, C.J., Wallace, J., Tang, J., Poole, J., Nelson, 
J., Noonan, J., O'Scannlain, J. and Trott, J.; Canby, J., with whom joined Pregerson, 
J., concurring.) The en banc court overruled a two-year old decision, Murphy v. 
Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988), which held 
that "Rule 11 permits sanctions only when the pleading as a whole is frivolous or of 
a harassing nature, not when one of the allegations or arguments in the pleading may 
be so characterized.· (Emphasis added). 
2. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1367. Rule 11, as amended in 1983, reads as follows: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one 
attorney of record in the attorney's individual name whose 
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an 
attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other 
paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, the pleadings need not 
be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity 
that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome 
by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained 
by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of 
an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that 
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation. Ifa pleading, motion, or other paper is 
not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or 
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In interpreting the application of Rule 11 sanctions imposed 
upon attorneys, the court overruled its prior holdings which 
imposed sanctions only upon documents which were frivolous as 
a whole. The court stated that earlier holdings provided an unnec-
essary and undesirable "safe harbor" for pleadings and other 
papers which included "improper or unwarranted allegations."3 
This article examines the Townsend decision and its inter-
pretation and application of Rule 11 sanctions. It further 
examines the development of Rule 11 sanctions in light of the 
liberal pleading standards introduced with the advent of the 
Federal Rules in 1938. Finally, the article reviews the criticisms 
and comments leveled at Rule 11, and speculates on its future 
and its impact on federal court litigation. 
II. FACTS 
Patrick Townsend and his family ("Townsend") initiated 
suit in state court to force his employer's Employee Benefit 
Plan ("The Plan") to pay for expenses incurred in excess of the 
$15,000 maximum allowed under the Plan's mental health pro-
visions when his daughter was hospitalized for psychiatric 
care.' The Plan retained the law partnership of Wilson & 
Reitman ("Wilson") to handle the state court litigation; attorney 
Fr~d Wright represented Townsend.5 Townsend, still repre-
sented by Wright, brought a federal suit after a majority of his 
state court claims were dismissed.6 In his federal court complaint, 
Townsend sued a number of defendants, including Wilson.7 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose up lin the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which 
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the 
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the fil· 
ing ofthe pleading, motion, or other paper, including a rea· 
sonable attorney's fee (emphasis added). 
3. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1363. 
4. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87· 
5825 and 87·6154, Nov. 8, 1988). 
5. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1361. 
6. [d. at 1361. The state court claims included breach of fiduciary duty, conspir· 
acy to defraud, breach of contract and violation of the California Insurance Code. 
Townsend, 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87·5825 and 87·6154, Nov. 8, 1988) 
Demurrers to all claims except violation of the California Insurance Code were sustained. 
Townsend, 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87·5825 and 87·6154, Nov. 8,1988). 
7. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1361. The complaint alleged three counts against 
Wilson: (1) that Wilson counseled the Plan to adopt the provisions which Townsend 
challenged; (2) that Wilson had advised the Plan to withhold certain payments 
allegedly owed Townsend; and (3) that Wilson improperly obstructed Townsend's state 
court challenges. [d. 
2
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Wilson moved for dismissal and sanctions and filed affi-
davits in support of the motion from one of the Wilson & 
Reitman attorneys and the Plan's employer.s The affidavits stat-
ed that Wilson played no role in the adoption or administration 
of the Plan and was unaware of the Plan's existence until 
retained for purposes of the Townsend litigation.9 The judge dis-
missed the complaint, after which Townsend filed an amend-
ed complaint,IO still naming Wilson as a defendant. ll 
Wilson again moved for dismissal and sanctions; the district 
court granted both motions. 12 The court imposed $3,000 in 
Isanctions against attorney Wright, but Townsend was again 
granted leave to amend his complaint against all defendants 
except Wilson. 13 Wright filed a notice of appeal,14 and then 
filed a motion in district court requesting reconsideration of the 
sanction order or, in the alternative, for a stay pending appeal.15 
The district court denied Wright's motions and ordered him to 
pay an additional $500 in sanctions. 16 In its order imposing the 
additional sanction, the court held that the motion for recon-
sideration was frivolous since it was filed during the penden-
cy of an appeal,17 thus stripping the district court of jurisdiction 
to consider the matter. IS The court further found that Wright's 
alternate motion was frivolous 19 because it did not comply 
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).20 Wright subsequently filed a notice 
8. [d. 
9. [d. Townsend did not challenge the affidavits. In fact, the court expressly held 
that "[i]t is undisputed that Wilson played no role in the actions of the Plan which gave 
rise to the claims against the other defendants." [d. 
10. [d. 
11. [d. The amended complaint charged Wilson with the second and third 
counts contained in Townsend's initial complaint and omitted only that portion of his 
charge which accused Wilson of advising the Plan to adopt the specific provisions chal-
lenged by Townsend. [d. 
12. [d. In granting the motion for sanctions, the district court found that the 
claims against Wilson were brought "without reasonable investigation, without ade-
quate basis in law or fact, and for purposes of harassment." [d. 
13. [d. 
14. The merits of the Townsend litigation were considered on separate appeal fol-
lowing the resolution of their action in district court. The court's disposition of that 
appeal was rendered in an unpublished decision, cited as Townsend v. Holman 
Consulting Corp., 862 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5825 and 87-6154, Nov. 8,1988). 
15. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1361. 
16. [d. 
17. [d. 
18. Smith v. Lujan, 588 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1979) (motions filed in the dis-
trict court during the pendency of a timely notice of appeal have no effect). 
19. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1361. 
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d) provides in pertinent part: 
When an appeal is taken the appellant, by giving a 
supersedeas bond, may obtain a stay .... The bond may be 
3
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of appeal from the second order imposing the $500 sanctions; 
the Ninth Circuit consolidated both appeals.21 
The original three-judge pane}22 which considered this mat-
ter reviewed the holdings of Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. 
Burroughs23 and Stewart v. American Int'l Oil & Gas CO.24 and 
reversed both sanction orders.26 Holding that a pleading could be 
sanctioned as frivolous only ifit could be found to be frivolous in 
its entirety, the court found the first amended complaint was not 
frivolous because it contained legitimate claims against some of 
the named parties.28 Further, the court found that the post-judg-
ment motion for a stay pending appeal, alternatively pleaded with 
the motion for reconsideration, likewise had some merit.27 
given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal or of 
procuring the order allowing the appeal, as the case may be. 
The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved 
by the court. (Emphasis added). 
Wright apparently failed to post the required bond upon the filing of his motion for 
a stay pending appeal. 
21. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1361. 
22. Circuit Judges Pregerson, Reinhardt and Noonan. Townsend v. Holman 
Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1988), en bane reh'g granted, 888 F.2d 646 
(9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990), amended and superseded by 
929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991). 
23. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), dissent from denial of en bane reh'g, 809 F.2d 
584 (1987). In Golden Eagle, the Ninth Circuit reversed sanctions imposed by the dis-
trict court against an attorney who failed to distinguish his arguments as being" 'good 
faith argument(s) for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,' rather 
than implying that its position was 'warranted by existing law.'" Golden Eagle, 801 
F.2d at 1534. The attorney had further failed to cite contrary authority as required 
by the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct; the district court cited this as an 
additional reason for the imposition of sanctions. Id. 
24. 845 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir. 1988). In Stewart, sanctions were imposed after 
the named defendant in a securities fraud action filed a third-party complaint which 
failed to meet the minimum requirements for an interpleader action under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 14, and, in addition, failed to state any basis in law under which relief could be grant-
ed. Id. at 198. The appellate court, in affirming the award of attorneys fees, found that 
sanctions had been properly imposed under Rule 11 both because the document was 
frivolous and because it was filed for an improper purpose. Id. "With frivolousness, 
the key question is whether a pleading states an arguable claim." Id. at 200. In dis-
cussing Rule 11 and its potential "chilling" effect, the court said, "[w]e are prepared 
... to draw the line between creative lawyering and abuse of the judicial process. Here, 
the process was abused." Id. at 201. 
The defendant in this instance had challenged venue and service ofthe original 
complaint, had attempted to transfer from district court in California to district 
court in Oklahoma, and had filed a nearly identical original complaint in district court 
in Oklahoma prior to filing its third-party complaint in California. Id. at 199. 
25. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1361. 
26. Id., see also Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 
1989), en bane reh'g granted, 888 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th 
Cir. 1990), amended and superseded by 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991). 
27. Townsend, 881 F.2d at 795. 
4
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The Ninth Circuit decided to hear the case en banc28 to 
reconsider cases regarding Rule 11 sanctions for particularly 
frivolous pleadings. 29 
III. BACKGROUND 
Until the adoption of the amended rule in 1983, Rule 11 
remained unchanged since the promulgation of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in 193830 and was rarely invoked31 to 
28. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 888 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (order-
ing rehearing en banc). 
29. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1361. 
30. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 originally read as follows: 
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall 
be signed by at least one attorney ofrecord in his individu-
al name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state 
his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided 
by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accom-
panied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of 
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of 
two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating 
circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney 
constitutes a certificate by him that he had read the plead-
ing; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and 
belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not 
interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed, or is signed 
with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule it may be 
stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as 
though the pleading had not been served. For a willful vio-
lation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate 
disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scan-
dalous or indecent matter is inserted. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938) (reprinted in 1 F.R.D. lxxv (1940). See supra note 2 for com-
plete text of amended Rule 11. 
31. Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 . Some 
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. 
L. J. 1313, 1315 n. 18 (1986). "Renewed use of the Rule in recent years suggests that 
... prevalent ideas about the propriety of sanctions against lawyers ... caused it to 
be ignored for so long." Id. at 1316, citing D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading 
and Its Enforcement: Some ·Striking" Problems with Federal Rule ofCilJil Procedure 
11,61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
At the time of Risinger's article, some seven years before the Rule was revised, 
he found only 19 reported cases in which genuine adversary Rule 11 motions took place. 
Id. at 35. Of these, violations were found in only nine instances. Id. at 36. In two other 
cases the court sua sponte found Rule 11 violations. Id. In four instances, the courts 
disposed of the matters on other grounds; disciplinary actions were initiated against 
counsel in two cases and alternative sanctions were imposed upon attorneys in three 
other cases. Id. at 36-37. One instance of striking the pleading as sham and false was 
upheld on appeal. Id. (citations omitted). 
One possible explanation for the rarity with which Rule 11 sanctions were 
invoked prior to its revision could be the perception that "not only [did] the Rule fail 
to delineate different sanctions for the various types of violations, but those sanctions 
that [were] expressly provided [were] both confused and confusing." Id. at 14. 
5
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impose sanctions upon attorneys who were thought to be abus-
ing the litigation process.32 The original rule, which was mod-
eled upon the old Equity Rule 24,33 was intended to deter 
frivolous or groundless motions and pleadings.54 It provided two 
separate and distinct provisions for the imposition of sanctions:36 
the striking of a pleading "as a sham and false"36 and a broad 
provision calling for appropriate disciplinary action for attor-
neys who wilf!111y violate the Rule's provisions.37 The rule did not 
expressly provide for the award of attorneys fees and costs as 
sanctions3S rather, the only penalty it specified was that a 
pleading found to be false could be stricken and litigation could 
proceed as if it had never been served.39 Thus, although the Rule 
was designed to discourage attorney dishonesty, its enforcement 
provisions were aimed at clients, not attorneys.40 
32. Marsha Grim, Comment, The Horizon of Rule 11: Toward a Guided Approach 
to Sanctions, 26 Hous. L. REV. 535, 542 (1989) "A ... flaw in the original Rule 11 was 
the discretionary nature of sanctions. Even if ajudge ... interpreted a lawyer's con-
duct as indicative of bad faith, the rule permitted the judge discretion to overlook the 
infraction." Id. See also Neal H. Klausner, Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing 
Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 
303 (1986). "Litigants rarely sought sanctions under former Rule 11 because proving 
subjective bad faith was too great a burden, and even if the burden was satisfied, sanc-
tions were discretionary." Id. at 313-14. 
33. Michael J. Mazurczak, Note, Critical Analysis of Rule 11 Sanctions in the 
Seventh Circuit, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 91, 94 (1988). Equity Rule 24, adopted in 1842, 
attempted to eliminate matters in pleadings which were "scandalous or impertinent." 
Responding to Justice Story's treatise on equity pleadings, Equity Rule 24 required the 
attorney's signature on pleadings as an "affirmation" of "good grounds" to support the 
substance of the pleading, not just its form. For a thorough discussion on the history 
and evolution of Rule 11, see Risinger, supra note 31. Equity Rule 24 read: 
Every bill or other pleading shall be signed individually by 
one or more solicitors of record, and such signatures shall be 
considered as a certificate by each solicitor that he has read 
the pleading so signed by him; that upon the instructions laid 
before him regarding the case there is good ground for the 
same; that no scandalous matter is inserted in the pleading; 
and that it is not interposed for delay. 
D. Michael Risinger, 61 MINN. L. REV. I, 13, n.26 (1976). 
34. Robert L. Carter, The History and Purpose of Rule 11, Remarks of Robert L. 
Carter, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 4, 4 (1985). Although the purpose of deterring unwarranted 
litigation was behind the 1938 version of Rule 11, "[t]he new 1983 amendment was 
designed to put teeth into the old rule." Id. It proposed to make the deterrence more 
effective by (1) making explicit the standard to be met by the attorney or party sign-
ing the motion, pleading or other paper; and (2) "granting to the trial judges clear 
authority to impose sanctions for violations of the Rule." Id. at 7. 
35. Mazurczak, supra note 33, at 95. 
36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938); see also 72 MARQ. L. REV. at 95. 
37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938). 
38. Grim, 26 Hous. L. REV. at 541. 
39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938); see also 72 MARQ. L. REV. at 95. 
40. Nelken, 74 GEO. L. J. at 1315. The client was thus penalized for the attorney's 
misconduct. Only rarely did the penalty extend to disciplinary action being taken 
against the attorney. Id. 
6
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The broad wording of the Rule, as originally promulgated, 
created widespread confusion among federal courts.'l The 
courts were reluctant to strike pleadings42 because it harmed 
the parties and did not punish their attorneys.43 The courts 
were similarly reluctant to impose disciplinary actions on 
attorneys and attorneys themselves were reluctant to invoke 
the rule through motions." Thus the courts, when faced with 
improper pleadings or pleadings introduced for an improper 
purpose, eventually settled upon a subjective standard of good 
faith as a means of gauging when the imposition of sanctions 
would be appropriate.46 This led to what is commonly referred 
to as the "pure heart but empty head" defense.46 This defense 
allowed attorneys, who honestly believed the truth of the facts 
or law contained in pleadings, immunity from the imposition 
of sanctions, despite the existence of contradictory case law or 
41. Advisory Committee Notes to Amendments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11, reprinted at 97 F.R.D. 165, 198. "There has been considerable confusion as to (1) 
the circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or motion or taking disci-
plinary action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign pleadings 
and motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate sanctions." Id. (citing R. 
Rodes, K. Ripple and C. Mooney, Sanctions Imposable For Violations of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, (64-65) (1981). 
42. Mazurczak, 72 MARQ. L. REV. at 96. One study conducted revealed only 
twenty-three instances in which an attempt was made to strike a pleading as "sham" 
under Rule 11 between 1938 and 1976. Id. at 96, n.29. 
43. Nelken, 74 GEO. L. J. at 1315 n. 15. "Although the language of the rule was 
directed primarily at lawyer honesty, the provision striking as sham historically 
required both a determination of the dishonesty of the pleader and the falsity of the 
pleading" (citing Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" 
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976) (thorough 
history of Rule 11 and its application prior to the 1983 amendments». See also Grim, 
26 Hous. L. REV. 535, 541 (1989). The original rule was aimed at deterring dishonest 
lawyers; courts were reluctant to severely penalize innocent parties whose only fault 
lie in their choice oflegal representation. 
44. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., __ U.S. _,110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990) 
("Courts ... reluctant to impose disciplinary measures on attorneys"); see also 
Michael E. Solimine, Rule 11 Litigation in the Sixth Circuit, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 425 
(1990) "[Mlost attorneys probably thought it unseemly to accuse another attorney of 
willfully violating the Rule." Id. at 429. 
45. Carter, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. at 6. "Eventually, the courts came to settle on the 
subjective and rather nebulous standard of good faith." Id. See also Westmoreland v. 
C.B.S., 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("pre-1983 amendment Rule 11 ... 
required a showing of subjective bad faith"). 
46. Arthur W. Andrews, Rule 11 and the Nondeductibility of Monetary Sanctions 
Imposed Upon Attorneys, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 279, 284 (1990) (" 'pure heart but empty head' 
no longer a defense"); see also Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 
1987). "[Clounsel can no longer avoid the sting of Rule 11 sanctions by operating under 
the guise of a pure heart and empty head." Id. In re Ronco, 105 F.R.D. 493, 496 
(1985), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 838 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1988). Courts 
were reluctant "to impose sanctions against the 'empty head, pure heart' lawyer." Id. 
7
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contrary evidence,47Because of the highly subjective standard 
imposed by the courts in deciding whether attorneys could 
properly be sanctioned, the rule remained rarely invoked prior 
to the 1983 amendments.48 Those amendments sprang from the 
perception that increasing abuses of the litigation process 
were overwhelming an already heavily burdened court system.·9 
The new Rule, as part of an integrated package of amend-
ed rules,60 attempted to clarify the sanctions process61 and 
47. Robin J. Collins, Note, Applying Rule 11 to Rid Courts of Frivolous Litigation 
Without Chilling the Bar's Creativity, 76 Ky. L.J. 891, 895 (1987-88); see also 32 Az. 
L. REV. at 284 (old subjective standard has been replaced by an objective standard; it 
is expected that the Rule will be triggered more often using the new standard). 
48. See Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some ·Striking-
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II, supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
49. Nelken, 74 GEO. L. J. at 1316. "1983 amendments were adopted after more 
than a decade of mounting concern about misuse and overuse of the litigation process, 
and an increasing federal caseload; citing Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger, 
Agenda for 2000 A.D. - Need for Systematic Anticipation, National Conference on the 
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (April 7-9, 
1976) (conference commemorating Roscoe Pound's address to American Bar Association 
1906 Annual Meeting), reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 79, 91 (1976). In his remarks, Burger 
said, "Correct or not, there is also a widespread feeling that the legal profession and 
judges are overly tolerant oflawyers who exploit the inherently contentious aspects 
ofthe adversary system to their own private advantage at public expense. - Address 
by Chief Justice Warren Burger, 70 F.R.D. at 91. 
50. Nelken, 74 GEO. L. J. at 1317. "The 1983 Amendments to Rules 7,11,16 and 
26 have been described as an 'integrated package' designed to make lawyers more 
accountable for their actions, increase judicial management of cases, improve the dis-
covery process and encourage use of sanctions where appropriate. - Id. 
Rule 7 sets forth the forms of pleadings allowed and the standards for motions. 
By expressly incorporating Rule 11 by reference, it ensures that the standards set forth 
in Rule 11 shall apply to all pleadings, motions, and papers filed in the court. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 11; Advisory Committee Notes, 97 F.R.D. at 191. 
Rule 16 is concerned with pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management of 
cases in the district courts. The revisions drafted in 1983 were made to "insure clos-
er and more effective judicial scheduling, management and control of litigation as a 
means of avoiding unnecessary delay and expense.- Advisory Committee Notes, 97 
F.R.D. at 190. 
Rule 26, which governs discovery, was amended to ·protect against excessive dis-
covery and evasion of reasonable discovery demands.- Id. In addition Rule 26, like Rule 
11, imposes upon each party or attorney an affirmative duty to "make a reasonable 
inquiry and to certify that certain standards have been met .. Id. Like Rule 11, violation 
of the discovery rule can result in the imposition of sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g). 
The Advisory Committee promoted the integrated features of the proposed 
amendments to the rules during their promulgation. "These proposals are designed 
to reduce discovery abuse and the abuse of process, to reform the procedures for the 
conduct of pretrial conferences and for the scheduling and management oflitigation 
by district judges .. .-). Advisory Committee Notes, 97 F.R.D. at 189. 
51. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., __ U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 2447,2454 
(1990). "To ameliorate these problems ['of confusion regarding when a pleading 
should be struck, what standard of conduct would make an attorney liable to sanctions, 
and what sanctions were available') the rule was amended in 1983 .. 
8
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expand the role of trial judges as case managers52 by both 
encompassing all "pleadings, motions, or other papers"63 and by 
attempting to create an objective standard to determine 
whether sanctions would be appropriate.54 The new Rule, like 
its predecessor,55 offers two grounds as the basis for the impo-
sition of sanctions. 66 First, the Rule requires that the pleading, 
motion or other paper be "well grounded in fact and . . . 
law"57 and that the attorney conduct a "reasonable inquiry" 
prior to signing the paper. 58 Second, the attorney or party 
signing the paper must not serve that pleading, motion or 
other paper for some improper purpose. 59 A violation of either 
or both of these rules may serve as the basis for sanctions. 60 The 
amended Rule further attempted to clarify the sanctions issue 
by articulating that appropriate sanctions may include rea-
sonable expenses incurred because of the inappropriate filings, 
including attorneys' fees. 61 In addition, in light of increased lit-
igation and crowded dockets, the new Rule imposes the same 
standards upon pro se parties as well as attorneys.62 The Rule 
52. Advisory Committee Notes, 97 F.R.D. at 190; see also 72 Marq. L. Rev. at 100. 
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
54. The new version of the Rule replaced the former subjective "bad faith" stan-
dard with an objective standard of "reasonableness under the circumstances." Advisory 
Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. at 198. The Committee went on to say, "[t]his standard is 
more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a 
greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation." Id. at 198-99. See also 
infra, note 58. 
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938). 
56. Mazurczak, 72 MARQ. L. REV. at 100. 
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983). "The new language stresses the need for some pre-
filing inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed 
by the rule." 28 U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P.'s, Rules 1 to 11, 1991 Supplementary 
Pamphlet at 441 (West 1991). 
58. 1991 Supp. Pamphlet at 441. [W]hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may 
depend on such factors as how much time for investigation was available to the sign-
er; whether he had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was 
based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel 
or another member of the bar. [d. at 441-42. 
59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983). 
60. Mazurczak, 72 MARQ. L. REV. at 100. 
61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983). 
62. [d. The Rule as amended applies to anyone who signs a pleading, motion, or 
other paper. "Although the standard is the same for unrepresented parties, who are 
obliged themselves to sign the pleadings, the court has sufficient discretion to take 
account of the special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations." Advisory 
Committee Notes at 442. 
Recent decisions by the Ninth Circuit strictly interpret the language of the 
Rule. It applies only to signers, and sanctions for violations of the Rule may not be 
imposed against lead counsel whose names appear on the pleadings but who did not 
actually sign the document for which sanctions have been sought. Giebelhaus v. 
Spindrift Yachts, 938 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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expressly provides for sanctions to be imposed upon repre-
sented parties, their counsel, or both, ifwarranted.63 
Amended Rule 11 has spawned vocal and widespread crit-
icism" and has been the subject of diverse constructions and 
applications in the various circuits.66 Because of this, the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States ("the Committee") issued a call, 
in August, 1990, for comments on Rule 11 and related rules 
from members of the bar, the bench, and the general public, to 
study the "operation and effect"66 of Rule 11.67 
But see Higbee v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 1991) "This court also 
has an 'obligation where the petitioner is pro se ... to construe the pleadings liber-
ally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.'" (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 
773 F.2d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1984). 
63. Mazurczak, 72 MARQ. L. REV. at 99-100. "A violation of any one of the affir-
mative duties embodied in Rule 11 will result in mandatory sanctions on the attorney, 
the client or both." (Emphasis in original.) 
64. See, e.g., Mark S. Stein, Rule 11 in the Real World: How the Dynamics of 
Litigation Defeat the Purpose of Imposing Attorney Fee Sanctions for the Assertion 
of Frivolous Legal Arguments, 132 F.R.D. 309,309-310 (1990) "Rule 11 ... gener-
ates wasteful 'satellite' litigation; chills both creativity and opposition to the status 
quo; and poisons the relationship between opposing counsel." See also Gregory P. 
Joseph, The Trouble With Rule 11: Uncertain Standards and Mandatory Sanctions, 
73 A.B.A. J. 87,89 (Aug, 1987). "Practicing under Rule 11 is like negotiating a mine-
field. You know there will be an explosion if you step on a mine. The trouble is, you 
don't know where the mines are." Id. Paul D. Freeman, The Rule 11 Ruckus, CAL. 
LAW., May 1991, at 17 "Disagreements about rule 11 ... are becoming increasing-
ly more strident." Id. 
65. See, e.g., Lyle v. Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 392, 398 (N.D. 
Ga. 1986), rev'd and remanded without opinion, 822 F.2d 64 (11th Cir. 1987). Rule 11 
imposes a duty of candor that requires counsel to cite contrary authority. See also 
Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) 
"Bad court decisions must be challenged if they are to be overruled, but the early chal-
lenges are certainly hopeless." Id. at 575. 
66. Call for Comments: Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 335, 338 (August, 1990) 
67. Id. at 344. In its call for comments, the Committee said: 
There is now a substantial and growing body of experience 
with these amendments. Over 1000 reported federal deci-
sions have applied or construed the 1983 amendments. 
There have been several empirical studies of the operation 
of the rules, and others are now in progress. There is a sub-
stantialliterature on the subject, as revealed in the bib-
liography appended to this Call. In addition, the Civil 
Rules Committee has received a wide variety of comments, 
some commending the 1983 amendments, others critical of 
them, and some proposing further revisions of the amend-
ed rules. In light of all the comment, the Committee has 
resolved to invite written public comments on the operation 
of the sanctions rules. 
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It is within the context of an evolving Rule 11 that the 
Ninth Circuit approached its analysis of Rule 11 sanctions in 
the Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp. appeal. 68 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY 
1. The Interpretation of Rule 11 in the Ninth Circuit 
In interpreting the plain language of Rule 1169 previous 
Ninth Circuit cases have mandated that "sanctions ... be 
imposed on the signer of a paper if either a) the paper is filed 
for an improper purpose, or b) the paper is 'frivolous.'"70 This 
interpretation of the Rule thus provides two distinct and inde-
pendent grounds for which sanctions can be imposed.71 
However, when both grounds are cited as a justification for 
the imposition of sanctions, the appellate court, in reviewing 
the sanctions award, must consider both grounds on appeal, 
because whether the paper violated one or both parts of the two-
prong test affects both the type and amount of the sanctions.72 
68. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991). 
69. In analyzing Rule ll, the Supreme Court has stated that the language must 
be interpreted "according to its plain meaning." Cooter & Gell, llO S.Ct. 2447,2453 
(1990). If the language of the rule is unambiguous, "judicial inquiry is complete." Pavelic 
& Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989). 
70. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991), 
citing Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986). The [Rulel 
is addressed to two separate problems, ... frivolous filings and ... misusing judicial 
procedures as a weapon for ... harassment. Zaldivar at 830. 
Prior to the 1983 amendments, the only undue purpose which could be sanctioned 
under the rule was "unjust delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. II (1938) (supra, note 30). The amend-
ed version of the Rule encompasses all types of improper purpose. Since the amend-
ed Rule was adopted, courts have imposed sanctions for many types of undue purpose. 
"The word 'frivolous' does not appear anywhere in the text of the Rule; rather, it 
is a shorthand that this court has used to denote a flling that is both baseless and made 
without a reasonable and competent inquiry." Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines frivolous as "[olf little weight or importance. A 
pleading is 'frivolous' when it is clearly insufficient on its face, and does not controvert 
the material points of the opposite pleading, and is presumably interposed for mere pur-
poses of delay or to embarrass the opponent." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 601 (5th ed. 1979). 
71. Westlake North Property Owners v. Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (Emphasis added); see Zaldivar, 780 F.2d 823,830-32. 
72. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362. "[Wlhether the paper is only frivolous or both 
harassing and frivolous could affect the nature of the sanction or the amount of dam-
ages awarded as a result of the sanction." [d. 
11
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The standard to be used when considering sanctions under 
either ground is an objective one.73 In detennining whether Rule 
11 sanctions are appropriate, the court must consider all cir-
cumstances.74 If the court finds that Rule 11 has been violat-
ed, it has discretionary power to fashion a sanction which is 
appropriate to the violation.75 
2. The Standard of Appellate Review 
Appellate courts give great deference to district courts in 
reviewing the appropriateness of sanctions under Rule 11.76 The 
Supreme Court has charged appellate courts with applying an 
abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a district court's 
determinations regarding Rule 11 sanctions. 77 "A district court 
would necessarily abuse its discretion ifit based its ruling on 
an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous 
assessment of the evidence. "78 
3. Rule 11 Jurisprudence - The Frivolous Prong 
Prior to the Townsend decision, the Ninth Circuit held, in 
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. 79 that sanctions 
73. [d. at 1362. See also Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829. Sanctions should not be 
imposed if a sound basis, in both law and fact, can be objectively determined at the 
time of the pleading, motion, or other paper. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d 1531, 1538; see 
also Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829. "The new text represents an abandonment of the sub-
jective focus of the Rule in favor of an objective one." [d. 
In making such a determination, the district court must consider three types of 
issues. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2457. First, the court must consider questions of 
fact, including the nature and scope of the inquiry conducted by the signer prior to fil-
ing the document and the factual basis of the document. [d. Next, the court must con-
sider questions of law in determining whether existing law warrants the position 
adopted in the document or whether the signer has made a valid good faith argument 
that the law should be changed. [d. Finally, the court must evaluate the credibility 
of the signer. [d. 
74. Cooter & Gell, __ U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. at 2457. 
75. [d. at 2457. 
76. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2459. "Familiar with the issues and litigants, the 
district court is better situated than the court of appeals to marshall the pertinent facts 
and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated by Rule 11." [d. The court went 
on to say, "[d]eference to the determination of courts on the front lines ofiitigation will 
enhance these courts' ability to control the litigants before them. Such deference will 
streamline the litigation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty of reweigh-
ing evidence and reconsidering facts already weighed and considered by the district 
court; it will also discourage litigants from pursuing marginal appeals, thus reducing 
the amount of satellite litigation." [d. at 2460. 
77. [d. at 2460-61. 
78. [d. at 2461. 
79. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), dissent from denial of en bane hearine, 809 F.2d 
584 (1987). 
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could not be imposed "if a particular argument or ground for 
relief' were found to be frivolous in an otherwise non-frivolous 
motion.80 The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of Golden 
Eagle in Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc. 81 and sev-
eral subsequent decisions82 and held that sanctions likewise 
could not be imposed if a particular claim or allegation were 
frivolous unless the document as a whole was frivolous. 83 
Further, these cases held that a signer cannot be sanctioned 
under Rule 11 if the signer relies on a non-supportable legal 
theory in support of a claim if a supportable theory exists as 
welJ.84 Given the holding of Murphy, the three-judge panel 
which originally considered the Townsend matter86 did not 
impose sanctions because the initial complaint contained mer-
itorious, as well as frivolous, causes of action.86 
The court granted en banc reconsideration of that deci-
sion in order to reassess the position of the Ninth Circuit on the 
appropriateness of Rule 11 sanctions for the filing of frivolous 
80. The court went on to say: 
Nothing in the language of the Rule or the Advisory 
Committee Notes supports the view that the Rule empowers 
the district court to impose sanctions on lawyers simply 
because a particular argument or ground for relief contained 
in a non-frivolous motion is found by the district court to be 
unjustified. . 
Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540-41 (emphasis added). 
The court in Golden Eagle was considering the appropriateness of sanctions in 
two areas: "a lawyer's failure to identify a legal argument as an argument for the 'exten-
sion' of existing law rather than as one for the application of existing law;" and "a 
lawyer's failure to cite contrary authority in violation of the American Bar Association 
ethical rules." Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1363. The Golden Eagle court held that Rule 11 
is not automatically violated by a violation of the American Bar Association's ethical 
rules. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1542. 
81. 854 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled by Townsend v. Holman 
Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991). 
82. Community Electric Servo of Los Angeles, Inc. V. National Electrical 
Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 869 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 891 (1990), overruled by Townsend V. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 
(9th Cir. 1991); Romero V. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989), over-
ruled by Townsend V. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991). 
83. Murphy, 854 F.2d at 1205. Murphy adopted the Golden Eagle interpretation 
without "discussion or elaboration." Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1363. 
84. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1363. 
85. The en banc court published an earlier decision, reported as Townsend V. 
Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990). The Townsend decision cited 
at 929 F.2d 1358 vacates the decision reported by the original three-judge panel 
(reported at 881 F.2d 788) and amends and supersedes the earlier en banc decision 
(reported at 914 F.2d 1136). 
86. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1363. 
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claims and allegations.87 In examining its past holdings and 
reevaluating them in light of Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it would be senseless to allow 
a party with one non-frivolous claim to "pile on frivolous alle-
gations without a significant fear of sanctions."88 This rea-
soning resulted in the overruling of Murphy.89 
4. The Townsend Complaint 
The Ninth Circuit has held that complaints must be found 
to be frivolous before they can be found to have been filed for 
an improper purpose.90 An overlapping standard for each of the 
independent grounds of inquiry is applied to complaints to 
ensure recourse within the judicial system for all legitimate 
causes of action.91 This is true even if the motives of the indi-
vidual in seeking that recourse are less than pure.92 
In Townsend, the district court imposed sanctions upon 
Wright because it found the complaint naming Wilson93 both to 
be frivolous and to have been filed for an improper purpose.94 
Attorney Wright was sanctioned only after, given an oppor-
tunity to amend his complaint in light of uncontroverted evi-
dence to the contrary, he continued to knowingly pursue false 
claims. 96 The Ninth Circuit found that, in light of these 
87. [d. The en bane court first examined the recent pronouncement in Cooter & 
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. that the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to improve the efficiency 
of the district courts. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., __ U.S. __ ,110 S. Ct. 2447, 
2454 (1990). "It is now clear that the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless fil-
ings in District Court and thus, consistent with the Rules Enabling Act's grant of author-
ity, streamline the administration and procedure of the federal courts." [d. 
88. Townsend, 929 F.2d 1358, 1363 (citing Murphy, 854 F.2d 1202). 
89. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1363. 
90. [d. at 1362. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. See also Westlake North Property Owners v. Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 
1301 (9th Cir. 1990). "In the context of a complaint, pleadings must first be determined 
to be frivolous before they can be determined to have been filed for an improper pur-
pose." [d. at 1305; Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986). The 
'grounds for imposing sanctions may apparently be considered independently when 
referring to arguments contained within pleadings, motions, or papers other than com-
plaints. Westlake North Property Owners, 915 F.2d at 1305. This is to ensure that plain-
tiffs' rights to bring legitimate complaints before the purview of the courts is not quelled 
by the threat of the improper purpose doctrine. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362. Indeed, 
the point of the adversarial system is to encourage the amicable resolution of disputes 
through the courts, not to discourage it. [d. 
93. See supra, notes 7-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the offend-
ing complaint in the underlying Townsend litigation. 
94. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362. 
95. 1d. at 1361. 
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circumstances, the district court's findings that Wright failed 
to make a "reasonable inquiry"96 prior to filing the first amend-
ed complaint were justified and did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion.97 The Circuit further affirmed the district court's 
objective findings that Wright's naming of Wilson as a defen-
dant was essentially vindictive. 98 The Ninth Circuit thus 
affirmed the $3,000 sanctions awards levied against Wright for 
his filing of the first amended complaint, even though the 
complaint also contained non-frivolous claims.99 
5. Potential Chilling Effects of Rule 11 
Cooter & Gell recognized that concerns about Rule 11's poten-
tial chilling effect on vigorous advocacy and its possible cre-
ation of satellite litigation could not be taken lightly.loo The 
Ninth Circuit examined these concerns and stated that whatever 
must be done to quell such concerns, "construct[ing] an artificial 
'safe harbor' for frivolous allegations or claims" is not the best way 
to answer them.101 Rather, the court said, these concerns could be 
addressed by an objective standard of inquiry that would take into 
account the unique circumstances of each case. 102 Thus, echoing 
Cooter & Gell, the Ninth Circuit noted that an attorney with only 
a very limited time in which to file a complaint or risk expiration 
of the statute of limitations would be afforded more latitude 
than an attorney with ample time for investigation. 103 
96. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362. The court stated, "Plaintiff did not make the 'rea-
sonable inquiry' required by Rule 11 and it is found that suing the lawyers was not 
in good faith and for the purposes of harassment." 1d. 
97. 1d. at 1366. 
98.1d. 
99. 1d. at 1367. In its reasoning, the majority added a caveat to district court 
judges that "thorough explanations of their reasons for imposing sanctions" are 
essential; appellate courts accord "great deference" to the "broad fact-finding powers" 
of district courts. 1d. at 1366. 
100. 1d. "Rule 11 must be read in light of concerns that it will spawn satellite lit-
igation and chill vigorous advocacy." Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1363 (quoting Cooter & 
Gell, _ U.S. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 2454). 
101. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1364. 
102. 1d. at 1364; Cooter & Gell, _ U.S. at __ , 110 S. Ct. at 2459; Golden Eagle, 
801 F.2d at 1536. "The new Rule was designed to create an affirmative duty ofinves-
tigation both as to law and as to fact before motions are filed. It creates an objective 
standard of ' reasonableness under the circumstances,'" 1d. (citing Advisory Committee 
Note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983». 
103. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1364. The Ninth Circuit found support for this 
approach when it looked to the Second Circuit's decision in Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 
F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986). In determining the propriety of sanctions OlilJeri held that 
a court must evaluate what information and knowledge the signer "reasonably· could 
have attained at the time of filing. OlilJeri, 803 F.2d at 1278-79. 
15
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The Ninth Circuit also stated that the liberal pleading 
standards imposed by the federal rules, which allow unlimited 
joinder of unrelated c,laims and parties in a single pleading, 104 
require some sort of deterrent effect not contained in its prior 
rulings embodied in Murphy.los To determine the appropri-
ateness of a multi-party and multi-claim pleading, the court 
stated that an objective standard of 'reasonableness under 
the circumstances' must apply.l08 
Because an assessment of whether or not a document is 
frivolous involves intense scrutiny by the district court,107 the 
Ninth Circuit held that such scrutiny "both adequately address-
es the concern that Rule 11 will be used to chill vigorous advo-
cacy and ... serves the Rule's central purpose of deterring 
abusive litigation tactics. "108 In response to concerns that 
excessive satellite litigation would abound as Rule 11 sanctions 
were appealed, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules ofthe Judicial Conference, which is 
studying the matter. lOB 
104. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): • A party asserting a claim to relief as 
an original claim ... may join ... as many claims ... as the party has against an 
opposing party." See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a): • All persons may join in one action 
as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative 
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of trans-
actions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons 
will arise in the action. All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants 
[d. 
" 
105. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1363. 
106. [d. at 1364. 
If the relevant facts are in control of the opposing party, more 
leeway must be given to make allegations in the early stages 
of litigation that may not be well-grounded. In a similar 
vein, leeway should be given to make allegations relating to 
an opposing party's knowledge, purpose or intent. If the 
case is one in which a prudent lawyer, to be safe, would 
name a number of defendants ... imprecision at the outset 
oflitigation should be tolerated. The same should be true if 
the case is one where, knowing a given set of predicate facts, 
a prudent lawyer would assert more than one legal theory as 
the basis for relief and would make alternative or inconsis-
tent allegations ... to support the different theories. 
107. "The issues involved in determining whether an attorney has violated Rule 
11 ... involve fact-intensive close calls." Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2460 (citations 
and internal quotations omitted). 
108. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1364. 
109. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1365. See also Call for Comments, 131 F.R.D. 335. 
Although the results of the study have not yet been published, the Call for Comments 
suggests that Rule 11 may well be revised in the near future. 
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6. The Post-Judgment Motion 
The Ninth Circuit next turned its attention to the district 
court's disposition of Wright's motion to reconsider the attor-
neys fee award, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b),l10 and Wright's 
alternative motion for a stay pending appeal. 111 The motions 
were filed after Wright had filed a notice of appeal from the 
order imposing sanctions. 112 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's disposition of the first motion. lIS The filing of the 
notice of appeal divested the district court of all jurisdiction to 
consider any modification or reversal of its previous sanction 
order and thus the motion was frivolous. 114 
The Ninth Circuit differed with the district court, how-
ever, regarding the disposition of Wright's alternative motion 
for a stay pending appeal. 116 The district court appeared to 
deny Wright's alternative motion based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 
62(d),116 which allows an appellant to obtain a stay pending 
appeal by giving a supersedeas bond. ll7 The stay becomes effec-
tive when the bond is approved by the court. lIB The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that past cases "have held that the district 
court may permit security other than a bond. "119 Therefore, the 
court reasoned, Wright's alternative motion for a stay had a 
valid and supportable argument, and he should not be 
110. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
On motion ... the court may relieve a party or a party's legal 
representative from a fmal judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence ... ; (3) 
fraud, ... misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 
been satisfied ... ; or (6) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment 
111. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1366. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. at 1367. 
114. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1366-67. See Crateo, Inc. v. Intermark, Inc., 536 F.2d 
862, 869 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976). (District court has no jurisdic-
tion to enter order under Rule 60(b) during pending appeal.) 
115. [d. at 1367. 
116. Supra, note 20. 
117. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). 
118. [d. 
119. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1367; see International Telemeter v. Hamlin Int'l Co., 
754 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1985). "Although ... a supersedeas bond may be used to stay 
execution of a judgment pending appeal, the court has discretion to allow other forms 
of judgment guarantee." [d. at 1495. 
17
Wilson: Civil Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
62 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:45 
penalized merely because he failed to cite relevant case law.120 
The Ninth Circuit accordingly ruled that the district court's use 
of the alternative motion for a stay as an additional basis for 
imposing sanctions was an abuse of discretion.121 The second 
sanctions award was thus remanded to the district court for a 
redetermination of the propriety of the amount of sanctions 
awarded based on Wright's frivolous motion. 122 
B. THE CONCURRENCE 
The concurring opinion by Judge Canby123 agrees with the 
treatment by the majority opinion of the sanctions imposed by 
the district court.124 However, the concurrence argues that 
Murphy and its subsequent line of cases should not have been 
overruled. 126 
Rather than overrule Murphy, the concurrence would pre-
fer a narrow holding that leaves in place a 'bright-line' rule: 
"Rule 11 sanctions for the filing of a complaint containing 
frivolous allegations or claims are inappropriate unless all of 
the claims against any particular defendant are frivolous. "126 
The concurrence reasoned, "[t]he unfounded claims have forced 
a party to come into court when that party never should have 
been involved at a11."127 The concurrence added that parties 
against whom well-founded claims have been pleaded must 
come into court to defend those claims and that the defense of 
any frivolous claims is typically "done by motion, without 
great hardship. "128 
Addressing the concern that such a ruling will "chill vig-
orous advocacy and [tend] to lead to a great deal of satellite lit-
igation,"129 the concurrence said, "[these potential consequences 
constitute] a lesser evil than is likely to arise under the major-
ity's approach. "130 
120. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1367; Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1541. 
121. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1367. 
122. [d. at 1367. 
123. Judge Pregerson joined in Judge Canby's concurrence. 
124. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(Canby, J., concurring opinion, n.1). 
125. [d. at 1367-68. 
126. [d. at 1368. (Emphasis in original). 
127. [d. at 1367. 
128. [d. at 1368. 
129. [d. at 1368 (citing Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540 n.4, 1541). 
130. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1368. 
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The concurrence concluded that such a rule "would protect 
defendants against frivolous lawsuits, without snaring the 
vigorous advocate who is viewed as having added one too 
many claims to a good lawsuit. And it would establish an eas-
ily-administered boundary within which to confine burgeoning 
satellite litigation over sanctions. "131 
V. CRITIQUE 
While the majority opinion seems concerned with the poten-
tial adverse effects of its ruling in Townsend, its concerns are not 
adequately addressed by the result it has fashioned. Although 
the ruling upholding the district court's award of sanctions 
against Wright seems proper under the circumstances, the 
potential for chilling creative advocacy, particularly in the area 
of civil rights is too great, and the proposed safeguards too 
ineffective, for the majority's holding to make good law. 
A number of practitioners and academics alike have voiced 
concerns over the potential chilling effects of Rule 11 since the 
1983 adoption of Rule 11.132 In a symposium on the amended 
Rule conducted in 1985,133 at least one critic noted that a chill 
to creative advocacy would destroy growth and development, 
both in the law, and, eventually, in society. 1M Even those who 
131. [d. at 1368-69. 
132. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th 
Cir. 1986). "Another major concern was that the broadened availability of sanctions 
might lead to protracted and expensive satellite litigation over the appropriateness 
of sanctions." [d. at 1537. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules acknowledged and 
addressed such concerns when it recommended the adoption of the Rule: "The Rule 
is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or 
legal theories. The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and 
should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time 
the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted." Advisory Committee Notes, 97 
F.R.D. at 199. (Emphasis added). 
133. Symposium: Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
How Go the Best Laid Plans? Association of the Bar of the City of New York, April 24, 
1985. 
134. Melvyn L. Weiss, A Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use of Amended 
Rule II, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 23. 
[d. at 23. 
Lawyers are trained to be creative and to be aggressive for 
their clients. It is that process that brings about meaningful 
changes in the law, changes which society requires in order 
to move forward. Unfortunately, I believe Rule 11 may sti-
fle this evolutionary process. If lawyers become inhibited 
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generally favor the Rule warn of its potential to impede access 
to litigation. 136 These concerns even touched the Advisory 
Committee that authored the amended version of the Rule. 136 
Given these concerns, the majority opinion in Townsend 
fails to fully recognize the potential danger of its holding. By 
failing to delineate a clear standard with which pleadings, 
motions and other papers filed in the district court can be 
determined to be frivolous, the Ninth Circuit is stifling cre-
ativity in the courtroom. Lawyers simply cannot tell, under the 
standard outlined in Townsend, when they may be subject to 
sanctions under the Rule. 
In fairness, the majority attempts to delineate a clear stan-
dard by requiring that each claim, argument, or motion be mer-
itorious or risk being the subject of sanctions. The clear 
standard fails, however, given the liberal pleading and broad 
access to discovery provided by the Federal Rules. It is often 
only through discovery that a litigant may discover that an indi-
vidual claim is without merit;137 yet it seems safe to presume 
that, as a general rule, a 'reasonable inquiry' will generally 
reveal proper defendants. 13S 
The concurrence acknowledges the legitimate concerns of 
the majority that a more liberal standard will result in a "safe 
harbor" for litigants to pile frivolous claims on top of more 
135. Charles Sifton, Response to a Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use 
of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 28 (1985) "[W]e want to keep our courts open 
to people with grievances, even those who are mistaken on who is at fault." [d. at 30. 
136. Advisory Committee Notes, 97 F.R.D. at 199 (supra, note 132). 
137. Debate does exist over this issue. While some advocates believe that plead-
ings should carry substantial weight in setting issues for trial, others believe that plead-
ings should merely provide a guideline for the conduct of pretrial discovery, pretrial 
conferences, and judicious use of the summary judgment tool. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, 
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE SEC. 5.3 at 240 (1985). 
138. Safeguards exist to protect defendants under this standard, as well. 
Amendments to pleadings adding additional defendants made after the expiration of 
the statute of limitations are generally disfavored, although the courts are very 
accommodating in allowing amendments containing minor corrections, such as 
spelling changes, to be filed even after the expiration of the statute of limitations, on 
a theory that such amendments "relate back" to the date the original pleading was filed. 
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE Sec. 5.27 at 306 (1985). 
Beware, however, to the defendant who through artful pleading attempts to 
cause the plaintiff to avoid discovery of the proper defendant until the statute of lim-
itations has passed. In those instances, courts will generally take a dim view of the 
defendants' actions and allow the amended complaint to relate back to the date of orig-
inal filing, even after the statute of limitations has expired. See, e.g., Zielinski v. 
Philadelphia Piers, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.Pa. 1956). 
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worthy claims. Yet the concurrence believes that the evils of 
providing a potential "safe harbor" are far outweighed by 
the potential such a rule has for chilling creative advoca-
cy.139Pleadings may be easily modified following discovery to 
remove those claims which do not have merit or for which evi-
dence or support cannot be found;140 as adversaries will gen-
erally have to defend against all the meritorious claims, 
defending against claims which may prove to be frivolous 
should not prove to be sufficiently difficult to warrant sanc-
tions against the pleader. 141 
The majority opinion gives an illusion of protection to 
potential litigants by imposing higher standards for sanc-
tioning complaints as opposed to other documents. 142 In order 
for a complaint to be the subject of Rule 11 sanctions, at least 
one of its claims must be found to be both frivolous and to have 
been filed for an improper purpose. l43 Rather than opening 
the door to discovery so that the merit of some claims can be 
explored and, if necessary, withdrawn prior to trial, the 
Townsend opinion seems to set a standard close to that of the 
old equity court writ system, where all the evidence had to be 
in place before the writ could even be filed. l44 
139. Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1368. 
140. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a): 
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served 
.... Otherwise, a party may amend the party's pleading only 
by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b): 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is 
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be sub-
served thereby .... " 
141. Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking 
for a Middle Ground in Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HAsTINGS L.J. 383 (1990). "Recently, the 
Supreme Court has eased the burden on the moving party in a summary judgment 
motion .... The increased availability of summary judgment should make it easier 
to dispose ofmeritless cases before trial and ... should work in tandem with Rule 11 
to reduce the burden such cases impose on the court system. Id. at 390 (citing Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322·23 (1986». 
142. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
143. Id. See also Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 837 (9th Cir. 1986). 
144. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 137, and Sec. 5.1 at 237. "Pleadings in courts of 
equity operated differently. There the pleadings consisted of the detailed statements 
of the parties, which in large part constituted both their contentions and the eVidence 
upon which the case was decided." Id. 
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By comparison, the concurrence addresses the concerns of 
Rule l1's critics that vigorous and harsh interpretations of the 
Rule will stifle creative developments of the law. The concur-
rence suggests a compromise approach to the concerns of those 
critics while still addressing the purpose underlying Rule 11: 
streamlining district court litigation.146 By leaving Murphy 
intact, the concurring opinion would provide all litigants with 
an adequate guideline with which to measure the potential for 
the imposition of sanctions, while at the same time would 
ensure broad access to the judicial forum. 
The evils of chilling creative advocacy are ominous and 
widespread, particularly in the area of Civil Rights litigation, 
which seems particularly vulnerable to Rule 11 sanctions. 146 
Recent studies suggest that defendants seek sanctions against 
plaintiffs far more often than plaintiffs seek sanctions against 
defendants,147 and that sanctions are sought against civil 
rights plaintiffs in disproportionately high numbers.14e One 
recent study found that while civil rights cases comprised only 
7.65% of the civil docket, Rule 11 sanctions in civil rights cases 
accounted for 22.4% of the total number of Rule 11 sanc-
tions considered. 149 
Given the skew of these numbers, it is too soon to tell if they 
reflect an alarming and increasing use of Rule 11 as a weapon 
145. Cooter & Gell v. Hartman: Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990). 
146. Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485 (1988-
89). "[I]mplementation [of Amended Rule 11] has disadvantaged civil rights litigants and 
attorneys during the initial half-decade of experience [with the Rule]. [d. at 487. 
147. [d. at 490. See also Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 
F.R.D. 189,200 (1988). Professor Vairo found that: 
In the 57.8% of the cases in which a Rule 11 violation is 
found, the plaintiff is the violator in 46.9% of the cases, 
while the defendant is the violator in only 10.9% of the 
cases. This great difference, however, is explained by the fact 
that the plaintiff is the target of the sanctions motion in 
536 of the 680 cases (78.8%) in which sanctions were request-
ed. Because plaintiffs are the target so much more fre-
quently, it is not surprising that they would be the Rule 11 
violators much more frequently in absolute numbers." 
What is most frightening, perhaps, is that "plaintiffs are 
sanctioned at a higher rate than defendants" (59.6% of the 
time while defendants are sanctioned only 51.4% of the 
cases in which they are the target). 
[d. (Emphasis in original). 
148. Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some 
"Chilling- Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. 
L.J. 1313, 1327 (1986). 
149. [d. 
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in civil rights litigation (as well as other types oflitigation) or 
simply that frivolous civil rights claims are filed in dispro-
portionately high numbers.16o At least one commentator sug-
gests that while the numbers themselves are not conclusive, 
they perhaps indicate that higher or different standards should 
be applied when considering sanctions in civil rights cases.161 
This approach seems reasonable. A standard which would 
allow sanctions in civil rights cases to be imposed only by the 
court sua sponte, and not upon motion, and only in instances 
where the actions of a litigant are particularly egregious, 
should be sufficient to both prevent undue congestion in the 
courts and to still allow access to judicial resolution of civil 
rights matters. For it is imperative that creative advocacy, par-
ticularly in the area of civil rights, be encouraged. To illustrate 
my point, I quote from Eastway Construction: 
Sometimes there are reasons to sue even 
when one cannot win. Bad court decisions 
must be challenged if they are to be over-
ruled, but the early challenges are certain-
ly hopeless. The first attorney to challenge 
Plessy v. Ferguson was certainly bringing a 
frivolous action, but his efforts and the 
efforts of others eventually led to Brown v. 
Board of Education.162 
Annette M. Wilson * 
150. Vairo, 118 F.R.n. at 201. 
151. [d. 
152. Eastway Construction v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp. 558, 575 (E.n.N.Y. 
1986). 
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